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Administrative Law News 
including the substantive changes from the previous 
effective version as well as any changes occurring from 
the proposed to the fmal version of the regulation. 
Notice requirements of the Administrative Process Act 
(§9.6.14:1 et seq. of the Code ofVtrginia), including 
the summary, basis, and impact statements and the 
economic impact analysis and agency response are also 
printed in the Vilginia Register. With the arrival of the 
VAC, the Vitginia Register will no longer print the full 
text of an amended regulation. Only the text of the 
section being altered will appear in the Virginia 
Register. 
Another useful resource to use in conjunction with the 
VA C is the Administrative Law Appendix. Lawyers 
Cooperative Publishing is also producing this soft 
bound compilation. Enclosed with each printed set of 
the VAC this reference is an excellent starting point for 
any re~atory research. The Administrative Law 
Appendix contains a resume of each agency's 
responsibilities and the statotory authority that enables 
the agency to promulgate and enforce their regulations. 
Each copy contains a listing of each agency's operative 
regulations, along with regulatory forms and documents 
incorporated by reference. Individual copies of the 
Administrative Law Appendix are available from the 
publisher. 
The VAC contains the full text of most agency 
regulations. However, to harness the rapidly growing 
size of the compilation, the Code Commission granted 
some exceptions. Subject areas regulated identically by 
the Commonwealth and the federal government do not 
receive full text coverage. However, these duplicate 
regulations do acquire a VAC number and are listed in 
chart format within the VAC. The end of each chapter 
contains a list of regulatory forms and documents 
incorporated by reference within the regulation. The 
Office of the Registrar can provide copies of these 
forms and documents. 
The Vtrginia Administrative Code will provide greater 
accessibility to the regulations of the Commonwealth's 
agencies. Look for future articles in this newsletter 
providing timesaving tips for conducting research with 
the printed text and the CD-ROM product. 
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J. W Burress, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 
decided by the Circuit Court for the Twenty-Third 
Circuit (Roanoke) in January, will soon appear in 
Volume 37 of Hamilton Bryson's Circuit Court 
Opinions. It involves judicial review of a decision by 
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles pursuant .to 
Article 7 of the Virginia Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 
Va. Code § 46.1-1500 et seq. The facts are as follows. 
With dealerships in Roanoke, Norfolk, and Gainesville, 
Burress sold street sweepers and their parts for the 
Elgin Sweeper Company. By a 1993 contract, Elgin 
designated for Burress an "area of primary sales 
responsibility" that included all of Virginia and part of 
North Carolina. ln 1994, Elgin informed Burress that 
Elgin was establishing another dealership, in Richmond. 
Burress objected, applying to the Commissioner for a 
hearing under Article 7 of the Dealers Act, which 
authorizes the Commissioner, at the behest of an 
existing franchised dealer, to review new franchises in 
"the relevant market area," and to require reasonable 
evidence that the market will support all the dealers of 
that line of motor vehicles in the area. ln this case, a 
hearing officer determined Burress's "relevant market 
area" to be the area of primary sales responsibility 
agreedupon by Burress and Elgin in their contract, i.e., 
all of Vtrginia. The hearing officer also reported that 
the record contained no evidence to support a finding 
that Vtrginia could support two Elgin Sweeper dealers. 
Afterwards, the Commissioner declined to adopt the 
hearing officer's choice of a market area, ruling instead 
that, because Burress's dealership was located in 
Roanoke, and because the statute defined relevant 
market area as within a radius of fifteen miles of the 
existing dealership, a Richmond dealership would not 
be located in Burress's relevant market area. Since, 
according to the Act, the new dealership would not 
encroach, Burress was not entitled to a hearing under 
the Act. Burress appealed to the circuit court. 
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At th~ time, the Dealers Act offered three different 
definitions of "relevant market area" for use in 
adjudicating disputes between dealers and franchising 
manufacturers. The definitions varied according to the 
density of population around the site of the complaining 
dealership. For disputes triggered by an attempt on the 
part of a manufacturer to put another dealership in the 
area, the Act defmed relevant market area using a ten-
mile radius in localities with populations of 250,000 or 
more, a fifteen-mile radius in localities with populations 
between 150,000 and 250,000, and either a twenty-mile 
radius or "the area of responsibility defmed in the 
franchise," whichever is greater, elsewhere. (For any 
other dispute covered by the Act, the relevant market 
areas was, regardless of the locality's population, either 
a twenty-mile radius or the area of responsibility 
defmed in the franchise.) 
The circuit court vacated and remanded, finding that the 
Commissioner's decision that Burress was not entitled 
to a hearing by the Commissioner was not supported by 
substantial evidence. According to the court, the record 
was devoid of any evidence at all to support the 
conclusion that Burress's dealership was located only in 
Roanoke, especially when Elgin Sweeper had conceded 
before the court that Burress had dealerships in Norfolk, 
Gainesville, and Roanoke. Treating the Commissioner's 
decision that Burress's market area was centered in 
Roanoke as a fmding of fact reviewed by reference to a 
substantial evidence standard, the court had no trouble 
setting it aside. 
In court, both sides agreed that Burress had dealerships 
in three locations: Roanoke, Norfolk, and Gainesville, 
and Elgin conceded that the record before the 
Commissioner proved as much. The court's opinion is 
therefore disingenuous at best in stating that the record 
before the Commissioner contained no support for the 
Commissioner's factual determination that Burress's 
dealership is in Roanoke. The record indeed supported 
a fmding that Burress deals in Roanoke; the real 
problem was that the record also proved Burress deals 
at two other locations as well. What therefore had to be 
considered by the Commissioner (and, later, the court) 
was how proof of three dealing locations could sustain 
a decision to treat Burress's relevant market area as 
related only to one. This is not an issue of fact, 
Norfolk, VIrginia 235 a mixed question oflaw and fact, 
but a question solely of law: how § 46.1-1500 applies 
to any dealership operating in more than one location. 
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When the court's opinion re-characterized the fatal 
failure in the Commissioner's record as the absence of 
any evidence to support the proposition that Burress 
sold Elgin products only from one location, the opinion 
implied such a condition is to be found in the statute. To 
the contrary, such a condition is not explicitly set forth 
in The Dealers Act. Indeed,§ 46.1-1500 opens with the 
proviso that the specific decisions which follow apply 
"[unless the context otherwise requires." Whether the 
condition that, for one dealership, several sites must be 
treated separately, should be found in§ 46.1-1500 by 
implication is another matter, leading inexorably to the 
tricky question of who gets to decide what the General 
Assembly would have wanted, i.e., what should be 
implied. Here, faced with a situation not explicitly 
addressed in the Act, the circuit court expressed no 
reservations about substituting its own view of what a 
relevant market area ought to be for that of the 
Commissioner, notwithstanding the general intention of 
the General Assembly, made clear in the very existence 
of the Act, that disputes of this sort are better handled 
by the Commissioner than by the courts. 
The Dealers Act has since been substantially amended, 
but it still offers three alternatives for defining the 
relevant market area when a dealer and his or her 
franchising manufacturer clash: a territory defined in the 
franchise agreement, a circle with a radius varying 
according to population density, or something else 
altogether, when "the context otherwise requires. The 
Act still dictates how to choose between the territory 
described in the franchise and the circle --whichever 
produces the larger area. However, the Act still does not 
say when the context otherwise requires, so that neither 
applies. More importantly, in the absence of any 
criterion, the Act is still silent as to who gets to decide. 
Attention Web Surfing Admin 
Lawyers! 
The American Bar Association's Administrative and 
Regulatory Law Section has made itself at home on 
the World Wide Web. Its home page has two addresses. 
To receive both text and graphics, use: 
http://grover.abanet.org/adminlaw/home.htrnl 
To receive only text, use: 
http://www.abanet.org/textonly/adminlaw/home/htrnl 
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